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SUMMARY
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence has recently changed its guidelines on discounting costs and eﬀects in
economic evaluations. In common with most other regulatory bodies it now requires that health eﬀects should be
discounted at the same rate as costs. We show that the guideline leads to sub-optimal decisions because it fails to
account for the changing value of health. NICE (and other regulatory bodies) should either use diﬀerential
discounting or stipulate how the changing value of health should otherwise be dealt with. We also show how binding
health service budget constraints should be incorporated in evaluations. Copyright# 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Discounting in economic evaluations has long been controversial, especially whether the volume of
health eﬀects, when measured in non-monetary units such as QALYs, should be discounted at the same
rate as costs (Cairns, 2001). The approach followed by most government and regulatory bodies is to
discount both costs and health eﬀects at the same rate, usually in the range of 3–5% (Drummond et al.,
1997; Gold et al., 1996; Smith and Gravelle, 2001). It is generally accepted that the social value of health
eﬀects increases over time (Claxton et al., 2006). But this is not allowed for in the conventional
approach, leading to sub-optimal investment criteria (Parsonage and Neuburger, 1992; Van Hout, 1998;
Gravelle and Smith, 2001; Viscusi, 1995; Spackman, 2004). One way to incorporate the growing value of
health is through diﬀerential discounting by using a lower discount rate for health eﬀects than for costs.
This discount rate for health eﬀects is equal approximately to the discount rate for costs minus the
annual rate of increase in the value of health.1 The implications of allowing for the changing value of
health can be profound (Brouwer et al., 2005).
*Correspondence to: iMTA, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
E-mail: brouwer@bmg.eur.nl
1The assumption of growing value of QALYs is empirical rather than normative and requires no departure from the standard
economic framework (Gravelle and Smith, 2001). If income levels were to fall over a sustained period then it is likely that the
social value of QALYs would fall. But whether the value rises or falls, the change must be incorporated into economic
evaluations of health care interventions. If the value of health falls and this is reﬂected by diﬀerential discounting then the
discount rate on health would be larger than the discount rate on consumption.
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The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) (NICE, 2001) and the English Department of
Health (1996) were in a minority in stipulating that health eﬀects should be discounted at a lower rate
than costs (Smith and Gravelle, 2001). But NICE has recently changed its guidelines (NICE, 2004) to
the conventional uniform discounting of costs and eﬀects. NICE did not prescribe any other way of
dealing with the increasing value of health; indeed the new guidelines do not discuss the issue. The
change in the NICE guidelines has been questioned and it has been suggested that, in the absence in the
NICE guidance of other ways of dealing with the increasing social value of health, diﬀerential
discounting is required (Brouwer et al., 2005).2
Claxton et al. (2006), (hereafter the NICE team), have now defended the new NICE guidelines
(NICE, 2004). The NICE team suggests that diﬀerential discounting is inconsistent and that the increase
in the social value of health, which they accept as ‘uncontroversial’, is not relevant for NICE. They
argue that, because NICE makes decisions about NHS interventions within a ﬁxed NHS budget, the
NHS threshold incremental cost-eﬀectiveness ratio (ICER) should be used to place a monetary value on
health eﬀects, which should then be discounted at the same rate as costs.
In this paper, we respond to these points. First, we set out a simple model to highlight the issues. We
use it to derive a set of alternative equivalent welfare maximising rules which incorporate adjustments
(a) for the changing value of health and (b) the opportunity cost of projects in a budget constrained
health service. Comparing the welfare maximising rules with the rules implied by the NICE criterion
shows that the NICE decision rules lead to sub-optimal decisions unless the NHS budget is set
optimally, so that the threshold ICER is equal to the marginal social value of health. We then discuss
the NICE team arguments against diﬀerential discounting and the need to allow for the changing value
of health and show that they are not well founded.
WELFARE MAXIMISING DECISIONS
Consider a two period example (a fuller version is in the Appendix). The welfare function for society is
W ¼Wðh1; h2;x1;x2Þ ð1Þ
where ht is health in period t and xt is consumption (measured in monetary units) in period t.
Although we refer to (1) as the welfare function we make no assumptions about whether it is ‘welfarist’
or ‘extra-welfarist’. It is merely a numerical representation of value judgements which satisfy very
weak requirements, including more consumption or health being preferred to less. Denoting the
marginal welfare from period t consumption and health by Wxt, Wht, there are four marginal rates of
substitution

dx2
dx1

W
¼
Wx1
Wx2
 1þ rx; 
dh2
dh1

W
¼
Wh1
Wh2
 1þ rh; 
dxt
dht

W
¼
Wht
Wxt
 vt t ¼ 1; 2 ð2Þ
Fixing any three of these determines the fourth. In particular,
1þ rh 
Wh1
Wh2
¼
Wx1
Wx2
Wh1
Wx1
Wx2
Wh2
¼ ð1þ rxÞ
v1
v2
¼
ð1þ rxÞ
ð1þ gvÞ
ð3Þ
2The NICE team misrepresent (Brouwer et al., 2005) by stating: ‘‘Brouwer and colleagues ... are not right in saying that when
health is measured in physical units like QALYs ... any increasing value of health has to be reﬂected in a lower discount rate’’
(Claxton et al., 2006). We simply argued that the growing value of health should somehow be accounted for and that: ‘‘When
health eﬀects are valued monetarily this can be done by using a growing value for health. When non-monetary quantities are
used, such as QALYs (as proposed in the NICE guidelines), the growth can be accounted for by lowering the discount rate for
eﬀects relative to that of costs – that is, diﬀerential discounting’’ (Brouwer et al., 2005). Brouwer et al. (2005) do not claim, pace
Claxton et al. (2005), that health and wealth cannot be traded.
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where gv is rate of growth in the value vt of period t health in terms period t consumption. Provided the
consumption and health interest rates (rc and rh) and the growth rate for v are not too large we can write
rhﬃrxgv. The questions at issue are how rh and rx enter the welfare maximising criterion for accepting
or rejecting a health service intervention and whether the NICE discounting rules are equivalent to
welfare maximising rules.
Consider an intervention which will change the number of QALYs in period t by Dht and have period
t costs, which are incurred only within the NHS, of Dct: The NHS has a ﬁxed budget in each period, so
that the cost of the intervention must be ﬁnanced by an equal reduction in expenditure elsewhere in
the NHS. Thus the intervention has direct health eﬀects and also has an opportunity cost in terms of the
reduction in QALYs due to the displaced NHS activities. Assume that the cost-eﬀectiveness of the
activities displaced equals the incremental cost-eﬀectiveness threshold for the NHS in period t: the cost
per unit of health gained by the marginal NHS activity in period t. Denote the threshold by kt.
The threshold ICER kt is determined by (a) technology (the increase in QALYs per £ spent) and (b)
the level of the budget, since the threshold ICER will decline as more is spent (see Appendix). It is not
directly aﬀected by the marginal social value of health vt , though it might be indirectly aﬀected if vt
inﬂuenced the NHS budget. Denote the growth rate in the threshold ICER by gk=(1+k2)/(1+k1)1.
If NHS budgets are set to maximise welfare then kt=vt and gk=gv. If the NHS budget is less than
optimal, then kt 5 vt: the cost of an additional QALY is less than its social value. Note that kt being
smaller or larger than vt does not imply that gk is smaller or larger than gv.
The period t opportunity cost of the intervention in health terms is Dct/kt. We can also use kt to
express the direct health eﬀects of the new intervention in terms of the amount of NHS budget that
would have to be spent to produce the same amount of health: kt Dht.
The intervention should be accepted if and only if the sum of the health eﬀects valued in terms of
consumption and discounted at the consumption rate of interest is positive, where the health eﬀects
include the opportunity costs of the activities displaced to ﬁnance the intervention within ﬁxed NHS
budgets:
Rule 1 (consumption discount rate):
Accept iff
DW
Wx1
¼ v1 Dh1 
Dc1
k1
 
þ v2 Dh2 
Dc2
k2
 
1
1þ rxð Þ
> 0 ð4Þ
NHS budgets are ﬁxed so the intervention has no eﬀect on consumption: it merely alters the time stream
of QALYs. If budgets are optimal, so that kt=vt, (4) simpliﬁes to:
Rule 10 (optimal budgets):
Accept iff
DW
Wx1
: v1Dh1  Dc1½  þ v2Dh2  Dc2½ 
1
ð1þ rxÞ
ð40Þ
Using deﬁnitions (2) and (3), (4) is equivalent to requiring that the intervention should be accepted if
and only if it increases the sum of QALYs when discounted to the present at the health discount rate:
Rule 2 (health discount rate):
Accept iff
DW
Wh1
¼ Dh1 
Dc1
k1
 
þ Dh2 
Dc2
k2
 
1
1þ rhð Þ
> 0 ð5Þ
We could also write Rule 1 with diﬀerential discounting, applying the consumption discount rate to
future cost changes and the health discount rate to future health changes (after valuing them in terms of
period 1 consumption):
Rule 100 (diﬀerential discounting):
Accept iff
DW
Wx1
¼ v1 Dh1 
Dc1
k1
 
þ v1
Dh2
1þ rhð Þ

v2
k2
Dc2
1þ rxð Þ
> 0 ð6Þ
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We can equivalently express the welfare maximising rule in various cost-eﬀectiveness forms. For
example, we could write it using the health discount rate, or the consumption discount rate, or
diﬀerential discounting, to compare the ratio of discounted costs to discounted health eﬀects with the
ﬁrst period incremental cost-eﬀectiveness ratio:
Rule 3 (CEA): Accept iﬀ
Dc1 þ
1
1þ gk
 
Dc2
ð1þ rhÞ
Dh1 þ
Dh2
ð1þ rhÞ
¼
Dc1 þ
1þ gv
1þ gk
 
Dc2
ð1þ rxÞ
Dh1 þ
ð1þ gvÞDh2
ð1þ rxÞ
¼
Dc1 þ
1þ gv
1þ gk
 
Dc2
ð1þ rxÞ
Dh1 þ
Dh2
ð1þ rhÞ
5k1 ð7Þ
The optimal decision rule incorporates the changing value of health and the NHS budget constraint.
Diﬀerential discount rates are one method of allowing for the changing value of health. If budgets are
set optimally, so that kt=vt and gk=gv, the optimal CEA rule is that the ratio of costs discounted at rx
and eﬀects discounted at rh should be less than the value of health. If the NHS is subject to non-optimal
budget constraints it is also necessary to allow for eﬀect of the budget constraints on the opportunity
costs. This can be seen as a correction on costs to reﬂect the forgone health from activities displaced to
fund the intervention.
THE NICE CRITERION
The NICE team’s criterion for evaluating an intervention is to ‘apply the appropriate cost-eﬀectiveness
threshold to QALYs gained in each time period and discount these costs and beneﬁts at the same rate
back to present values.’ (Claxton et al., 2006, p. 3). Since the costs and adjusted health eﬀects have the
dimension of consumption, we interpret this to mean that the NICE team criterion is (numbering the
rules in the same way as the corresponding welfare maximising rules)
NICE Rule 1 (consumption discount rate):
Accept iff k1Dh1  Dc1½  þ k2Dh2  Dc2½ 
1
1þ rNx
  > 0 ð8Þ
Thus the criterion has current period consumption as the unit of account, uses the threshold ICER to
place a monetary valuation on the health change in each period, and then applies a discount rate
appropriate to consumption as set by NICE (rNx ; where superscript N refers to NICE). Deﬁning r
N
h ¼
ð1þ rNx Þ=ð1þ gkÞ  1ﬃ r
N
x  gk; we can also express it using diﬀerent discount rates for health and
costs
NICE Rule 100 (diﬀerential discounting):
Accept iff k1Dh1 þ
k1Dh2
ð1þ rNh Þ
 Dc1 
Dc2
1þ rNx
  > 0 ð9Þ
With current health as the unit of account the NICE rule is
NICE Rule 2 (health discount rate):
Accept iff Dh1 
Dc1
k1
 
þ Dh2 
Dc2
k2
 
1
1þ rNh
  > 0 ð10Þ
Thus this version of the NICE team criterion can be described as using the ICER threshold to express
the ﬁnancial costs of the intervention as forgone QALYs and applying a health discount rate to future
health changes.
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We can also express the NICE decision rule in terms of three equivalent cost-eﬀectiveness ratios
NICE Rule 3 (CEA): accept iﬀ
Dc1 þ
Dc2
ð1þ gkÞð1þ rNh Þ
Dh1 þ
Dh2
ð1þ rNh Þ
¼
Dc1 þ
Dc2
ð1þ rNx Þ
Dh1 þ
Dh2ð1þ gkÞ
ð1þ rNx Þ
¼
Dc1 þ
Dc2
ð1þ rNx Þ
Dh1 þ
Dh2
ð1þ rNh Þ
5k1 ð11Þ
Both the welfare maximising rules and the NICE rules can be expressed (a) using current health as the
numeraire and with a health discount rate, or (b) with current consumption as the numeraire and with
either diﬀerential discounting or direct adjustment of health eﬀects.
The key question is whether the NICE team criterion leads to welfare increasing decisions: does it
lead to the best possible health stream given the NHS budget constraints? Comparison of the NICE
rules with the welfare maximising rules shows that the NICE rules are welfare maximising if and only if
the NICE health and consumption discount rats are equal to those derived from the welfare function
ðrNx ¼ rx; r
N
h ¼ rhÞ and if NHS budgets are set optimally (vt=kt) in all periods aﬀected by the
intervention.
Using the model we next deal with the NICE team’s objections to allowing for the changing value of
health by diﬀerential discounting.
WHAT DISCOUNT RATE?
The NICE team note, and we agree, that because of externalities, risk premia, and intergenerational
issues, market rates of interest may not be useful as a guide to what discount rate to use in health care
evaluations. But we do not use this fact as the basis for arguing for diﬀerential discounting as one means
of allowing for the changing value of health. The consumption and health discount rates in the model
are derived from the social welfare function. For the purposes of deciding how to deal with the changing
value of health it is unnecessary to specify the relationship between these rates and market rates of
interest. We merely need to recognise that in general, because of the changing value of health, the
consumption and health interest rates will diﬀer.
IS HEALTH TRADABLE?
The NICE team suggests that advocacy of diﬀerential discounting rests on the assumption that health is
not tradable (Claxton et al., 2006, p. 1) i.e. that it is not possible to change the time stream of health.
Nothing in our arguments requires the assumption of non-tradability: interventions will in general
change the time stream of health. The question is how changes in health in diﬀerent periods should be
valued in order to decide whether the intervention is worthwhile. Tradability requires discounting but
the fact that consumption and health are both tradable does not imply that they should be discounted at
the same rate, as contemplation of the deﬁnitions of rates of interest in (2) makes clear. The rate at
which society discounts a QALY and the rate at which it discounts consumption are linked by the rate
at which the value of health changes.
CONSISTENCY
The NICE team suggest, drawing on the argument of Weinstein and Stason (1977), that the
‘fundamental problem with diﬀerential discounting . . . is really one of consistency between present and
terminal values’ (Claxton et al., 2006). By this they mean that the cost per QALY from an intervention
should be independent of whether it is calculated by discounting future costs and health eﬀects back
to the present or compounding them forward to a future date. We agree that consistency is important.
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But it is not a demanding criterion: both the welfare maximising and the NICE rules are consistent in
this sense. Multiplying the numerator in the cost-eﬀectiveness ratio (7) by (1+rx) and the denominator
by (1+rh)(1+gv) gives costs and eﬀects compounded forward to period 2 but has no eﬀect on the cost-
eﬀectiveness ratio since (1+rh)=(1+rx)/(1+gv). Similarly, the NICE cost-eﬀectiveness ratio in (11) is
unaﬀected if the numerator is multiplied by ð1þ rNx Þ and the denominator by ð1þ r
N
h Þ(1+gk) since
ð1þ rNh Þ ¼ ð1þ r
N
x Þ=ð1þ gkÞ: (See Box 1 for an illustration.)
Box 1. Consistency: an undemanding requirement
The NICE team use a simple numerical example to illustrate ‘‘the fundamental problem with diﬀerential
discounting’’, which is that it would lead to inconsistencies between present and ‘‘terminal values’’.
Consider a health care technology which costs £10 000 now and provides one QALY in 10 years,
while the cost discount rate is set at 3.5%. The ICER can be calculated either (a) by compounding
current costs forward at the cost discount rate to derive a ‘terminal value’ and dividing this by the
QALY gain in year 10 ([£10 000(1.035)10]/1QALY), yielding £14 106 per QALY or (b) by discounting
the volume of QALYs back at the cost discount rate (equalling 0.7089 QALY) and then dividing the
current costs by the discounted QALY gain (£10 000/[1/(1.035)10]), again yielding £14 106 per
QALY. The fact that both approaches yield the same ICER demonstrates consistency.
In their example the NICE team do not state what is assumed about the value of health. If this
value is increasing over time, then the ICER as calculated above is incorrect and will not lead to
optimal decisions. It is, however, perfectly possible to be consistent and optimal.
Take the example of the NICE team and assume a 2% annual increase in the value of QALYs.
Then, compounding costs forward at the cost discount rate to derive a ‘terminal value’ (i.e. £14 106)
and dividing this by the volume of QALYs adjusted upwards to account for the growth in the value
of QALYs ([£10 000(1.035)10]/[1 (1.02)10]) yields an ICER of £11 571. The same ICER results from
dividing current cost by the adjusted number of QALYs discounted back by the cost discount rate:
£10 000/[1 (1.02)10/(1.035)10]=£11 571.
Both methods are consistent but only the latter is optimal. Moreover, the latter calculation can be
conveniently approximated using diﬀerential discounting, that is by dividing current costs by the
number of QALYs discounted back using the health discount rate. In the example the health
discount rate equals [(1.035/1.02) 1], which can be approximated by 1.5% (i.e. 3.5–2%), yielding an
ICER of: £10 000/[1 (1.015)10]=£11 605.
INCREASING VALUE OF HEALTH
The NICE team argue that the NHS has a ﬁxed budget and therefore should judge projects using an
ICER threshold which ‘can then be used to convert QALYs into equivalent money terms which can be
compared directly to costs’ and therefore that ‘it is not the societal valuation that is relevant for NICE
but the shadow price of the NHS budget constraint, and this may or may not increase over time’
(Claxton et al., 2006).
First, the NICE team are correct in asserting that the criterion for evaluating interventions must take
account of the any binding budget constraints but, as the formal model shows, they are mistaken in
thinking that such constraints imply that the social marginal value of health should be replaced by the
ICER threshold: both must be included in the decision rule. The role of the ICER threshold is to adjust
the nominal cost eﬀects of the intervention to reﬂect their true opportunity costs when the budget is
constrained. But once the adjustment has been made, the health time stream must be valued using the
social value of health. (See Box 2.)
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Box 2. A question for the NICE team
The NICE team stress that the health care budget is ﬁxed so that acceptance of a project with
positive expenditure will have an opportunity cost in forgone health. We agree. Suppose that after
allowing for the activities displaced in each period, a project reduces QALYs by 100 this year and
increases them by 103 next year. Suppose the cost discount rate is 3.5% and that the value of a
QALY increases by 2% per year (implying a discount rate for health of approximately 1.5%). We
would accept the project since the QALY gain discounted at 1.5% (or the QALY gain adjusted by
the growth in the value of QALYs and discounted at 3.5%) is higher than the opportunity costs of
100 QALYs this year. Would the NICE team accept or reject the project?
The decision rule put forward by the NICE team leads to socially inferior decision-making unless the
ICER threshold is equal to the marginal social value of health in all periods aﬀected by an intervention.
Box 3 illustrates this for a case in which the current budget is optimal (so v1=k1), but the future ICER
threshold kt is assumed constant even though the value of health is growing over time so that gk=gv in
the calculations. This may represent the decision context perceived by regulatory bodies.
Box 3. Optimal investment with optimal current budget but a sub optimal future budget
Assume NICE has to decide about the implementation of two independent projects:
* Project A costs £100 000 in the current year 1 and yields 10 QALYs in year 21
* Project B costs £100 000 in the current year 1 and yields 7 QALYs in year 11
Assume further that
(1) v1=k1 (the current budget is optimal so that the current threshold equals the current social
value of a QALY);
(2) the discount rate on costs is 5%;
(3) the value of QALYs will increase by 3% annually (gv=0.03);
(4) k is constant over time (gk=0) (so that kt5vt for t>1: future budgets are sub-optimal–too small)
According to the NICE team’s CEA decision rule (11) the ICER of project A is £100 000/
10(1.05)20=£26 533. The NICE ICER of project B is £100 000/7(1.05)10=£23,270. B has a more
favourable ICER than A using the NICE rule.
The ICER of programme A calculated by the welfare maximising CEA rule (7) is £100 000/[10(1.03)20/
(1.05)20]=£14 691, which may be approximated by £100 000/10(1.02)20. The ICER of programme B is
£100 000/ [7(1.03)10/(1.05)10]=£17 315, which may be approximated by £100 000/7(1.02)10. According to
the welfare maximising rule A has a more favourable ICER than B.
The ﬁnal decisions depend on k1. As an illustration we indicate the decisions under the NICE rule and the
welfare maximising rule for diﬀerent thresholds:
NICE rule Welfare maximising rule
kl project A project B project A project B
£30 000 accept accept accept accept
£25 000 reject accept accept accept
£20 000 reject reject accept accept
£15 000 reject reject accept reject
£10 000 reject reject reject reject
Socially preferable programme A is the ﬁrst to be rejected under the NICE rule and both programmes are
less likely to be accepted for a given k1=v1, illustrating the risk of socially inferior decision-making under
the NICE rule.
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Second, if the ICER threshold increases or decreases over time, the NICE team decision rules require
that the volume of future and current QALYs be valued diﬀerently. This could be done through
diﬀerential discounting or through explicit adjustment of the volume of QALYs. Hence the claim that
their decision rule is ‘entirely consistent with the recommendations of the Washington Panel’ (Claxton
et al., 2006) is too strong since the Panel, following Weinstein and Stason (1977), assumes a ‘steady-state
relationship between money and health beneﬁts’ (Gold et al., 1996) i.e. a monetary value of QALYs that
remains constant over time.
Table I illustrates the diﬀerences between the Washington Panel, NICE team, and welfare maximising
rules for an intervention which has a period 1 cost of £25 000 and produces 1 additional QALY in 10
years time. In this example, the NHS has too small a budget in both periods: the value
of a QALY exceeds the threshold ICER in both periods and both increase over time. The cost-
eﬀectiveness ratio computed using the Washington Panel rule3 exceeds the period 1 threshold
ICER (equivalently, the discounted value of the project in terms of period 1 consumption is negative)
and therefore leads to a rejection of the intervention. The NICE team criterion uses the period 10
threshold ICER to value period 10 health. It produces a positive net present value and a
cost-eﬀectiveness ratio less than the period 1 threshold ICER (£30 000) and so would accept the
project. A suﬃciently low period 10 ICER, however, would yield a negative NICE net present
value or NICE cost-eﬀectiveness ratio in excess of £30 000. This highlights the sub-optimality
of the NICE rule. Since the project has no expenditure in period 10, it has no opportunity cost
in period 10, and the value of the ICER threshold in period 10 should have no eﬀect on whether
the project should be accepted. In this case, only the social value of the additional QALYs in period 10
is relevant. Applying the welfare maximising rule leads to rejection of the project because its
opportunity cost in terms of forgone health in the current period is greater than the value of the future
increase in health.
Table I. An application of the three investment decision rules when budgets are not set optimally
Year 1 Year 10
Intervention
Change in costs Dc 25 000 0
Change in QALYs Dh 0 1
Assumptions
ICER threshold k 30 000 36 570 gk=2%
Value of QALY v 35 000 40 619 gv=1.5%
Consumption discount rate rx 3.5%
Decision rules
Cost-eﬀectiveness ratio Present value
Washington Panel rule: No adjustment for k, v
Dc1
Dh10=ð1þ rxÞ
10
¼ 35 265 Dc1 þ
Dh10
ð1þ rxÞ
10
¼ 188
NICE rule: Adjustment for k only
Dc1
ð1þ gkÞ
10Dh10=ð1þ rxÞ
10
¼ 28 930 Dc1 þ
k10Dh10
ð1þ rxÞ
10
¼ 3796
Welfare maximising rule: Adjustment for k and v
Dc1
ð1þ gvÞ
10Dh10=ð1þ rxÞ
10
¼ 30 387 
v1
k1
Dc1 þ
v10Dh10
ð1þ rxÞ
10
¼ 371
3We take the Washington Panel rule to imply that no adjustment for the changing value of a QALY is made but that v1 is applied
to value health in all periods and that no adjustment for the binding budget constraint is made.
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AN NHS PERSPECTIVE?
NICE takes a narrow view of what should be taken into account in evaluating NHS interventions. Its
guidance is intended to represent ‘an eﬃcient use of limited NHS and PSS (Personal Social Services)
resources. For these pragmatic reasons, the appropriate. . .perspective on costs is that of the NHS and
PSS’ (NICE, 2004, p. 11). A failure to consider some costs, for example, those borne by patients, can
lead to non-welfare maximising decisions. But this is not the reason for the divergence between the
welfare maximising and NICE discounting decision rules set out above since we assume that all costs
fall on the NHS.
NICE’s objective is ‘maximising health gain from limited resources’ (NICE, 2004, p. 11). Given ﬁxed
budgets, the NHS seeks the best time stream of health. Operationalising this objective requires
speciﬁcation of the relative value of future and current health: i.e. a discount rate on health. But as we
showed above, all welfare functions imply that the rate of discount on health will diﬀer from the
consumption discount rate unless the value of health in terms of consumption is constant over time. The
NICE team’s acceptance of a changing value of health over time is therefore incompatible with the
NICE guidance to use the same discount rate on QALYs and costs. This is true even if NICE took the
rather odd view that the objective function the NHS diﬀers from the welfare function, so that the NHS
should have a marginal rate of substitution of current and future health which diﬀers from society’s.
CONCLUSION
We welcome the explanation provided by the NICE team indicating why NICE has moved from
diﬀerential discounting to equal discount rates. We are in broad agreement on a number of important
issues: health is tradable, binding NHS budget constraints must be reﬂected in the investment decision
rules, and the social value of health is likely to increase over time. But we have two substantive
disagreements: the NICE team use the threshold ICER to adjust health eﬀects, rather than using them
to adjust cost eﬀects to get the correct measure of opportunity cost; and they do not use the social value
of health to value QALYs.
The question of how the changing value of health should be incorporated in the investment criterion
is secondary. But some adjustment for the increase in the value of health over time must be made.
Diﬀerential discounting is one way to do so and a practical one at that. NICE, and almost all other
regulatory bodies, should therefore change their guidance to instruct evaluators that they should follow
one of the welfare maximising rules and (a) adjust costs using the threshold ICERs if budgets are not set
optimally and (b) either adjust the volume of health eﬀects to take account of the changing value of
health (after which the discount rate used for costs can be used) or use diﬀerential discounting and apply
a discount rate to health eﬀects which is adjusted for the changing value of health. NICE must therefore
provide guidance on a number of crucial parameters: the discount rates for costs (consumption) and
health, current and future values of QALYs and, if budget constraints are binding, current and future
threshold ICERS. Its current guidelines promulgate the wrong decision rules and fail to provide the
information to make them operational. A return to diﬀerential discounting would therefore be a
practical way of moving toward optimal decision rules.
APPENDIX A
This appendix provides an explicit policy model to support the analysis in the text.
There are two policy makers. The Treasury chooses a budget for health care. The Department of
Health decides how to allocate the budget. They have the same objectives and perceive the same
constraints. The Lagrangean for the policy problem of choosing an optimal consumption and health
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stream is
Wðh1; h2; x1; x2Þ þ
X
t
lt Bt  ct½  þ yf ðh1; h2; c1;c2Þ þ
X
t
mt yt  Bt  xt½  ðA1Þ
yt is income in year t, assumed exogenously determined. Bt is the NHS budget, and the technological
constraints are summarised in the implicit production function f(h1,h2,c1,c2) 0 where fht50, fct>0.
The DH chooses a set of projects that exhausts its budgets, is eﬃcient (f=0) and produces the most
socially valuable time stream of health according to the welfare function. It takes consumption and its
budget as given. First-order conditions on ht and ct are
Wht þ yfht ¼ 0; t ¼ 1; 2 ðA2Þ
lt ¼ yfct; t ¼ 1; 2 ðA3Þ
The incremental cost-eﬀectiveness thresholds are the period t marginal costs of period t health
evaluated at the DH optimal choices:
kt 
@ct
@ht
¼ 
fht
fct
¼
Wht
lt
ðA4Þ
The Treasury chooses consumption and the NHS budget over time to satisfy
Wxt ¼ mt ðA5Þ
lt  mt ¼ 0 ðA6Þ
(If the government has access to credit markets or can inﬂuence private sector investment then it will be
possible to link the discount rate on consumption rx=Wx1/Wx2 1 to market rates of interest and the
marginal productivity of private sector investment.)
Hence, if the budget is set optimally,
kt ¼ 
fht
fct
¼
Wht
lt
¼
Wht
Wxt
¼ vt ðA7Þ
and the ICER equals the marginal value of health.
In general, whether or not the NHS budget is set optimally, the period t reduction in welfare arising
from the Dct period t cost of an intervention which must be ﬁnanced from the given budgets is, using
(A2) and (A3), ltDct ¼ ðWht@ht=@ctÞDct ¼ ðWht=ktÞDct: Hence the change in welfare from an NHS
intervention which changes the health stream by Dh1, Dh2 and has costs of Dc1, Dc2 which must be
ﬁnanced from the ﬁxed budgets is, in terms of current consumption,
DW
Wx1
¼ Dh1Wh1  l1Dc1 þ Dh2Wh2  l2Dc2½ 
1
Wx1
¼
Wh1
Wx1
Dh1 
l1
Wx1
Dc1 þ
Wh2
Wx2
Wx2
Wx1
Dh2 
l2
Wx2
Wx2
Wx1
Dc2
¼ v1Dh1 
v1Dc1
k1
þ v2
1
ð1þ rxÞ
Dh2 
v2
k2
Dc2
ð1þ rxÞ
ðA8Þ
which yields Rule 1 (4) in the text.
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